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SOCIAL MEDIA, POLITICAL CHANGE, AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Sarah Joseph* 
Abstract: In this Essay, the role of social media in progressive political 
change is examined in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings. The con-
cept of social media is explained, and Clay Shirky’s arguments for and 
Malcolm Gladwell’s arguments against the importance of social media in 
revolutions are analyzed. An account of the Arab Spring (to date) is then 
given, including the apparent role of social media. Evgeny Morozov’s ar-
guments are then outlined, including his contentions that social media 
and the Internet can be tools of oppression rather than emancipation, 
and spreaders of hate and propaganda rather than tolerance and democ-
racy. The United States’ policy on Internet freedom is also critiqued. Fi-
nally, the role, responsibility, and accountability of social media compa-
nies in facilitating revolution are discussed. 
Introduction 
 In early 2011, revolutionary fervor spread across the Arab world. 
Unarmed and largely peaceful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt overthrew 
long-standing dictators, and unprecedented protests arose in most other 
Arab States. Violent protests erupted in Libya, sparking a civil war be-
tween the government and armed rebels. With the aid of an interna-
tional coalition, the rebels overthrew longtime Libyan dictator Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi in August 2011. At the time of writing, the future of 
the uprisings in Yemen and Syria remains uncertain. Protests spread be-
yond the Arab world to States as diverse as Uganda,1 Israel,2 and Spain.3 
 
* Sarah Joseph is a Professor of Law at Monash University, Melbourne, and the Direc-
tor of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law. I must thank Melissa Castan, Frank Gar-
cia, Tania Penovic, Marius Smith, and Ethan Zuckerman for their very helpful comments 
on and assistance with this essay, though all mistakes are of course my own. I must also 
thank the excellent editorial team at the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Network for Journalists, Uganda: ISPs Har-
assed, Told to Shut Down Facebook, Twitter for 24 Hours (Apr. 25, 2011), available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201104260238.html. 
2 See, e.g., Dan Williams, Factbox—Israel’s Cost of Living Demonstrators and Their Demands, 
Reuters, Aug. 6, 2011, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/08/06/uk-israel-
economy-factbox-idUKTRE7752HB20110806. 
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The role of social media in these uprisings has been lauded, and the 
term “Twitter Revolutions” has become ubiquitous. 
 Does social media really deserve the plaudits it has received? After 
all, popular revolutions overthrew brutal governments long before the 
advent of Web 2.0: Iranians overthrew the Shah in 1979, Filipinos over-
threw President Marcos in 1986, Communist bloc States in Eastern Eu-
rope crumbled one by one in 1989, and huge demonstrations precipi-
tated the fall of Indonesia’s President Suharto in 1998. Vast numbers of 
Westerners are engaged with social media; is it possible that we are nar-
cissistically trying to inject ourselves into the picture? In this Essay, I will 
examine the phenomenon of social media and its role in promoting 
and prompting progressive political change, particularly in autocratic 
States. 
I. What is Social Media? 
 Social media is defined as “a group of Internet-based applications 
that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, 
and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Con-
tent.”4 “Web 2.0” refers to Internet platforms that allow for interactive 
participation by users.5 “User generated content” is the name for all of 
the ways in which people may use social media.6 The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) specifies three cri-
teria for content to be classified as “user generated:” (1) it should be 
available on a publicly accessible website or on a social networking site 
that is available to a select group, (2) it entails a minimum amount of 
creative effort, and (3) it is “created outside of professional routines 
and practices.”7 Although purely commercial websites are excluded 
under this definition, interactive blogs run by firms are included be-
cause the conversation generated therein extends beyond the purely 
commercial. Emails and text messages are also excluded from the defi-
                                                                                                                      
3 See, e.g., Leila Nachawati Rego, Spain: ‘Yes We Camp,’ Mobilizing on the Streets and the In-
ternet, Global Voices (May 20, 2011, 15:26 PM), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/05/ 
20/spain-yes-we-camp-mobilizing-on-the-streets-and-the-internet/. 
4 Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and 
Opportunities of Social Media, 53 Bus. Horizons 59, 61 (2010). 
5 Id. at 60–61 (noting that Web 2.0 may be contrasted with Web 1.0 platforms, which 
simply provide content to users without giving them the opportunity to interact with or 
modify the information online). 
6 Id. at 61. 
7 OECD, Participative Web and User-Created Content: Web 2.0, Wikis, and Social 
Networking 18 (2007) [hereinafter OECD Report] (emphasis omitted); see also Kaplan & 
Haenlein, supra note 4, at 61. 
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nition because they are not available via websites or social networks. 
Nevertheless, mass texting (or mass emailing) operates in a manner 
similar to social networking sites by facilitating the immediate distribu-
tion of information, including information from social media sites, to a 
large audience in a form that is easily re-transmittable. 
. 
                                                                                                                     
 There are different types of social media: collaborative projects, 
virtual worlds,8 blogs, content communities, and social networking.9 
Collaborative projects involve people working together to create con-
tent; Wikipedia is the most famous example of these.10 Wikipedia is an 
influential source of global information, partly because a Wikipedia 
entry will often be among the first retrieved by an Internet search. 
Online collaboration platforms can also allow people in different loca-
tions to share and edit documents together; these can be particularly 
useful for persons with similar political goals to collaborate on strategy 
documents. For example, Google Docs were used to convey protest tac-
tics and demands during the Egyptian uprising in early 2011.11 
 Blogs, the most rudimentary form of social media, involve the cre-
ation, by a person or group, of web-based content on any topic of the 
author’s choice. Individuals may interact with a blog by commenting on 
its content. Originally, blogs were mainly text-based; now, many incor-
porate pictures and videos.12 Video blogs (vlogs) are also becoming 
more common;13 Mohammad “Mo” Nabbous ran a “television station” 
in Benghazi—the rebel stronghold in Libya in early 2011—that could 
classify as a vlog through which Nabbous reported events in his city to 
the world via a live video stream.14 Blogs are key tools for dissident ac-
tivity in States that control mainstream media
 
 
 
8 Virtual worlds include virtual games or virtual social worlds such as Second Life. In 
the former, “players” must adhere to game rules and protocols. In the latter, players “es-
sentially live a virtual life” and are constrained by little more than “basic physical laws such 
as gravity.” See Kaplan & Haenlein, supra note 4, at 64. Virtual worlds are not particularly 
relevant to this essay, though it is worth noting the existence of new gaming developments 
relevant to human rights, such as games designed to teach people about social justice. See 
Laura Stampler, ‘America 2049’ Facebook Game Promotes Social Justice, Huffington Post (Apr. 
19, 2011, 10:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/19/facebook-game-social-
justice-america-2049_n_850892.html. 
9 See Kaplan & Haenlein, supra note 4, at 62–63.
10 Id. at 62–63. See Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
11 David Wolman, The Instigators, at location 400 (Kindle ed. 2011). 
12 See OECD Report, supra note 7, at 36. 
13 See id. 
14 Nabbous was killed by a sniper on March 19, 2011, while reporting on the Gaddafi re-
gime’s claims that it was adhering to a ceasefire in the wake of the UN’s authorization of the 
use of force. See Matt Wells, Mohammed Nabbous, Face of Citizen Journalism in Libya, Is Killed, 
148 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:145 
 Content communities are sites where users can share content with 
other members of their online community.15 Well-known examples of 
these communities include Flickr, for photos, and YouTube, for video. 
Sites like these are invaluable resources for exposing government bru-
tality to the world. The video of the killing of Neda Agha-Soltan during 
the Iranian protests of 2009 is a particularly poignant example. The 
video “went viral” and drew widespread condemnation of the Iranian 
government’s tactics. 
 Finally, people share information on social networking sites, of 
which Facebook and Twitter are among the most popular. These sites 
are very versatile, enabling the sharing of text, pictures, videos, audio 
files, and applications. Facebook enables users to create a profile page 
and share information with an unlimited number of virtual “friends.” 
These “friends” are usually known to the user in real life, but this con-
nection is not essential. For groups, brands, or companies, it is more 
common to set up pages that attract an unlimited number of “fans” 
who do not have to be approved. The user chooses whether to limit 
access to their profile by adjusting an intricate series of privacy settings. 
The site has become phenomenally popular; as of September 2011, the 
company boasted 800 million active users16—more than ten percent of 
the world’s population. 
 The micro-blogging site Twitter allows users to “tweet” text-based 
content of up to 140 characters to a global audience. Users share a sur-
prising amount of information in 140 characters by including links to 
articles, pictures, photos, videos, and audio streams. A user’s tweets are 
immediately visible to “followers,” though a user can institute controls 
over the persons who can follow his or her feed; all users can “block” 
other users to deny them access to the feed. Ordinarily, though, a per-
son can follow any other person such that, unlike a Facebook user’s 
relationship with “friends,” a Twitter user may know very few of his or 
her followers. Further, most tweets are public and searchable on the 
Internet, and are easily distributed via the “retweet” function. Twitter is 
an extraordinary source of information, partly because it links vast 
numbers of people otherwise unknown to one another. In this context, 
users often learn more from strangers than from friends. Twitter is also 
searchable by topic. Tweets can be organized by “hashtags,” which indi-
                                                                                                                      
Guardian News Blog (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/mar/ 
19/mohammad-nabbous-killed-libya. 
15 See Kaplan & Haenlein, supra note 4, at 63. 
16 Emil Protalinski, Facebook Confirms It Now Has 800 Million Users, ZDNet (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-confirms-it-now-has-800-million-users/3949. 
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cate that a particular tweet relates to a certain topic. For example, sto-
ries about the uprising in Tunisia were often tagged “#Tunisia,” making 
it easier for people to find tweets on that topic. In April 2011, Business 
Insider reported that there were 21 million active Twitter users.17 While 
its user base is only a fraction of Facebook’s, Twitter is becoming an 
extremely influential source of real-time news.18 
 One common characteristic among social media sites is that they 
tend to be free and are therefore widely accessible across socioeco-
nomic classes. Anyone can create a Facebook or Twitter account, up-
load a YouTube video, or write a WordPress blog without cost. Of 
course, access to social media depends upon access to the Internet, 
which is ubiquitous in the West but less available in the developing 
world. Internet access is expanding rapidly, however; as of February 
2011, one-third of the world’s population has Internet access.19 
 A crucial development is the advent of mobile social media.20 Mo-
bile phones with Internet capabilities are becoming common, and mo-
bile phone usage in the developing world is far more extensive than 
usage of personal computers.21 Mobile phone subscriptions are even 
increasing exponentially in notoriously closed societies like North Ko-
rea.22 Smartphones and other phones with Internet capabilities are also 
becoming more common, especially as earlier generations of phones 
are replaced. In July 2011, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that 
global mobile penetration is predicted to reach one hundred percent 
by 2016, and that half of all mobile phones will be Smartphones with 
                                                                                                                      
17 Nicholas Carlson, Twitter Has Less Than 21 Million ‘Active’ Users, Bus. Insider (Apr. 4, 
2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-has-less-than-21-million-active-users-2011-4. 
18 See Blake Hounshell, The Revolution Will Be Tweeted, Foreign Pol’y, July 1 2011, at 20, 
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/the_revolution_will_be_ 
tweeted. 
19 Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices 
and Challenges in a Networked World, Address at The George Washington University, 
Washington DC, (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/ 
156619.htm [hereinafter 2011 Clinton Address]. 
20 See Kaplan & Haenlein, supra note 4, at 67. 
21 See, e.g., Kara Andrade, Citizen Media: Mobile Phone Democracy, ReVista Harv. Rev. 
Latin Am., Spring/Summer 2011, at 36, 37; Anonna Dutt, How 3G Can Change the Face of 
Rural India, Youth Ki Awaaz (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.youthkiawaaz.com/2011/04/ 
how-3g-can-change-the-face-of-rural-india/. 
22 See Adam Rawnsley, Smartphone Fever Hits North Korea: Kim Looks for Cure, Wired Dan-
ger Room Blog, (Apr. 13, 2011) http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/04/gadget- 
fever-hits-north-korea-kim-looks-for-cure/. 
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Internet access.23 Indeed, trends indicate that soon anyone with a 
phone will be able to access social media at any time, in any place. 
II. Malcolm Gladwell and the Skeptics 
 Malcolm Gladwell is a prominent skeptic of the importance of social 
media in progressive social and political change. In an October 2010 ar-
ticle in the New Yorker, he argues that real social change is brought about 
by high-risk meaningful activism, pointing to a number of famous exam-
ples:24 the 1960s sit-ins by black college students in Greensboro, North 
Carolina; the year-long Montgomery bus boycott organized by Martin 
Luther King, Jr. in 1955 and 1956; and Australia’s indigenous “Freedom 
Ride”25 and the “Green Bans.”26 According to Gladwell, such movements 
are characterized by strong group identity and cohesion with strong ties. 
 Gladwell argues that social media connections promote weak ties 
and low-risk activism, or “slacktivism.” He argues that “liking” some-
thing on Facebook, or retweeting a story, requires little effort, yet those 
actions might lull the protagonists into thinking they are doing some-
thing meaningful.27 Gladwell caustically notes that “Facebook activism 
succeeds not by motivating people to make a real sacrifice but by moti-
vating them to do the things people do when they’re not motivated 
enough to make a real sacrifice.”28 
 Gladwell also argues that successful activism requires strategic hier-
archies, with a careful and precise allocation of tasks, like the structure 
used to sustain the Montgomery bus boycott.29 Social media, he argues, 
                                                                                                                      
23 See Lucy Battersby, Total Coverage: Mobile Service Set to Go Global by 2016 as World Gets 
Smart, Sydney Morning Herald, July 19, 2011, at B2, available at http://www.smh.com.au/ 
business/total-coverage-mobile-service-set-to-go-global-by-2016-as-the-world-gets-smart-201107 
18-1hllk.html. 
24 See Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change, New Yorker, Oct. 4, 2010, at 42, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell. 
25 Id. University of Sydney students traveled through New South Wales on the Freedom 
Ride, protesting in the country towns. The Freedom Ride was designed to draw attention to 
discrimination against and disadvantages of Australia’s indigenous peoples. Daniel Lewis, 
Freedom Ride Inspires a New Generation, Sydney Morning Herald, Feb. 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/Freedom-Ride-inspires-a-new-generation/2005/ 
02/04/1107476802617.html. 
26 The Green Bans were imposed by Australian construction unions in the early 1970s 
to prevent the demolition of heritage sites in Sydney. Meredith Burgmann & Verity Burg-
mann, Green Bans Movement, Dictionary Sydney (2011), http://www.dictionaryofsydney. 
org/entry/green_bans_movement. 
27 See Gladwell, supra note 24. People can express their approval of something on Fa-
cebook by clicking on a “like” button. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. 
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creates loose and essentially leaderless networks he does not believe are 
capable of organizing revolutions: 
Because networks don’t have a centralized leadership struc-
ture and clear lines of authority, they have real difficulty 
reaching consensus and setting goals. They can’t think strate-
gically; they are chronically prone to conflict and error. How 
do you make difficult choices about tactics or strategy or phi-
losophical direction when everyone has an equal say?30 
As a chilling example of his thesis, Gladwell notes that Al Qaeda, which 
engages in a very extreme form of activism, “was most dangerous when 
it was a unified hierarchy,” rather than a loosely affiliated network of 
cells.31 Finally, Gladwell claims that social media is a conservative 
force—that it distracts people from “real” activism by deluding them 
into thinking that they are effecting change when in reality they are 
not. In his words, “it makes it easier for activists to express themselves 
but harder for that expression to have any impact.”32 
 Evgeny Morozov, visiting scholar at Stanford University, has also 
commented on the tendency of the Internet to distract people from 
important issues. He believes that few use it for political activism, while 
people use the Internet in huge numbers to view pornography, play 
games, watch movies, or share pictures of “lolcats.”33 While these trivial 
uses of the Internet and social media are well known in the West, there 
is no reason for the situation to be different in authoritarian States. 
Morozov cites the apparent de-politicization of East German youth 
caused by access to West German television as an example of the leth-
argy that can be induced by popular but unserious pastimes.34 Is it pos-
sible that the Internet is helping to spawn a version of Aldous Huxley’s 
Brave New World of hedonism and triviality? Need Big Brother no longer 
                                                                                                                      
30 See id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion 81–82 (2011). “LOL” means “laugh out 
loud.” Definition of LOL, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/lol (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
34 Morozov, supra note 33 at 65–68 (citing Holger Lutz Kern & Jens Hainmueller, Opi-
um for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilise Authoritarian Regimes 17 Pol. Analysis 
377–99 (2009)). Indeed, Morozov notes the tendency in the West to believe that Internet 
use in authoritarian States focuses on noble causes and emancipation, while acknowledg-
ing that it is not generally used for that purpose in the West. For example, President 
Obama extolled the emancipating virtues of the Internet when visiting China in 2009, but 
six months later in a speech in Virginia, he said that the net could be a distraction and a 
diversion. Id. at 242. 
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fear revolt because the population is too busy chattering about Big 
Brother on social media? 
 Morozov notes the danger that the sheer volume of information 
available through social media—coupled with its increased general 
availability via the Internet and 24/7 news cycles—creates shorter atten-
tion spans in which important news is quickly supplanted by new devel-
opments elsewhere. For example, the “Twitterverse” flocked to read and 
retweet news of the ultimately unsuccessful Iranian uprising of June 
2009. Yet the story was swiftly cast aside upon the death of pop megastar 
Michael Jackson.35 While social media may create quicker and louder 
conversations, those conversations may tend to be shallow, short, and 
easily displaced by the newest “big thing.” 
III. Clay Shirky and the Believers 
 Not all commentators share Gladwell’s skepticism of the power of 
social media. New York University media professor Clay Shirky believes 
that social media is an important new tool for promoting social and 
political change. In a January 2011 article in Foreign Affairs, written be-
fore the Arab Spring, he cites a number of examples where social me-
dia was the catalyst for significant political change, such as its role in 
coordinating protests that ultimately forced out Moldova’s communist 
government after a fraudulent election in 2009.36 Shirky argues that 
“political freedom has to be accompanied by a civil society literate 
enough and densely connected enough to discuss the issues presented 
to the public.”37 He endorses the theory of sociologists Elihu Katz and 
Paul Lazarsfeld that the formation of well-considered political opinions 
is a two-step process.38 The first step requires access to information; the 
second, use of that information in conversation and debate. Under this 
framework, Shirky argues that social media has revolutionized how 
people form political opinions and has made information so widely ac-
cessible that more people than ever are able to develop considered 
points of view. 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. at 66. 
36 Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media, 90 Foreign Aff. 28, 28–29 (2011). 
37 Id. at 34. 
38 See Elihu Katz & Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence: The Part Played 
by People in the Flow of Mass Communications 32–34 (1955). 
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A. Step One: Access to Information 
 By making “on the ground” eyewitness accounts widely available, 
social media has expanded access to information in an important new 
way. Reporting is no longer confined to traditional sources like journal-
ists; instead, social media grants access to unfiltered information related 
by any person affected by an event who chooses to share the story. For 
example, a key voice on Twitter during the Arab Spring has been 
@angryarabiya,39 the daughter of Abdullhadi Al Khawaja, a human 
rights activist in Bahrain who was jailed for life in June 2011 for dissident 
crimes. Her tweets have been followed closely by those monitoring de-
velopments in the Arab uprisings. 
 Furthermore, information is spreading faster and farther: 
@angryarabiya’s tweets reach a global audience in real-time. This means 
that information from far corners of the world is accessible to exponen-
tially larger and more geographically diverse groups. Although in the 
context of a revolution the most important audiences for such informa-
tion are the local people, regional and global audiences help to ensure 
that a person’s message is heard and spread. This attention also means 
that an activist’s disappearance is more likely to be noticed and re-
ported.40 Knowledge that their message is widely available may even 
embolden activists, reinforcing “their conviction that they are not 
on
                                                                                                                     
al e.”41 
 Social media also expands access to evidence of human rights 
abuses beyond that offered by the mainstream media and non-
government organizations (NGOs), and penetrates veils of secrecy 
thrown up by repressive regimes.42 “[T]echnology has allowed us to see 
into many parts of the world that were previously shrouded by oppres-
sive governments or geographical boundaries.”43 Anyone in the vicinity 
of an event with audacity and a camera can document brutality and 
spread it on the Internet. And the proliferation of camera phones 
means this information often can be disseminated instantaneously. In-
 
39 Every username on twitter commences with the symbol “@”. 
40 See Ethan Zuckerman, The Cute Cat Theory Talk at ETech, My Heart’s in Accra Blog 
(Mar. 8, 2008, 11:29 AM), www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2008/03/08/the-cute-cat-theory- 
talk-at-etech. 
41 Lev Grossman, Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement, Time, June 17, 2009, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html. 
42 See Daniel Joyce, New Media Witnessing and Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Defender, Mar. 
2011, at 23–25. 
43 Ben Cole, The Web as a Spotlight: An Alternative Look at Technology in the Arab Spring, 
Huffington Post (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-cole/the-web-as-
a-spotlight-an_b_850679.html. 
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deed, the way NPR’s Andy Carvin reported on the Arab Spring epito-
mizes this new type of reporting: a marriage of sorts between traditional 
and social media. Carvin’s novel approach, curating and retweeting in-
formation from verified sources on the ground, has received widespread 
cla
kdown by the U.N. was 
or
ded the narrative of the revolt to 
its opponents at home and abroad.”49 
                                                                                                                     
ac im.44 
 Moreover, social media amplifies the message of its users.45 In late 
April 2001, for example, the New York Times reported that written ac-
counts, photos, videos, and other information from demonstrators in 
Syria were being relayed around the world via social media by a small, 
dedicated group of roughly twenty Syrian exiles scattered across the 
globe.46 The work of this relatively tiny team of activists helped ensure 
that the world was kept aware, in real time, of the Syrian government’s 
attacks on unarmed and generally nonviolent protesters.47 It is worth 
noting in this regard that at the time of writing the number of civilian 
deaths attributed to the Assad regime’s crac
m e than five thousand over nine months.48 
 By comparison, in 1982 the Syrian army apparently massacred tens 
of thousands of residents of the town of Hama in roughly one month. 
The world did not learn of the killings until much later, and even then 
the information that emerged was incomplete and difficult to verify. 
The extent of the Syrian government’s brutality did not become fully 
known to the world until years later, and by then it was far too late. To-
day, through the work of cyber activists, the Syrian government came 
under immediate pressure to refrain from cracking down violently on 
dissident protests. Indeed, the regime has been confronted with the 
reality that it “ha[d] almost entirely ce
 
44 See Blake Hounshell, Tweets of Gore, Foreign Pol’y, May 6, 2011, available at http:// 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/06/tweets_of_gore. 
45 See Sarah Kessler, Why Social Media is Reinventing Activism, Mashable (Oct. 9, 2010), 
http://mashable.com/2010/10/09/social-media-activism. 
46 See Anthony Shadid, Exiles Shaping World’s Image of Syria Revolt, N.Y. Times, April 23, 
2011, at A1. 
47 See Andrew Osborn, At Least 2660 Killed in Syria Since Start of Protests, Telegraph 
(U.K.), Sept. 12, 2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middle 
east/syria/8757583/At-least-2660-killed-in-Syria-since-start-of-protests.html. 
48 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syria Death Toll Hits 5,000 as Insurgency Spreads, Reuters (Dec. 
13, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/us-syria-
idUSTRE7B90F520111213. 
49 Shadid, supra note 46; see Amanda Flu, The Revolution Will Be YouTubed: Syria’s Video Re-
bels, Time World, (May 5, 2011) http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2069721, 
00.html; Robert Mackey, April 15 Update on Mideast Protests and the Libyan War, N.Y. Times 
Lede Blog (April 15, 2011, 11:55 AM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/ 
latest-updates-on-mideast-protests-and-libyan-war-2. 
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 Finally, outside the social media field, an important new platform 
for information access is taking shape with the emergence of Wik-
iLeaks.50 Described as a “whistleblower” site, WikiLeaks received infor-
mation through a secure website from individuals within governments, 
corporations, and organizations, and posted the original documents 
online. In 2010 and 2011, working in part with news outlets in the Unit-
ed States and Europe, WikiLeaks released huge tranches of classified 
information, allegedly leaked to it by a solider in the U.S. Army: the in-
formation included military documents from the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq and thousands of State Department cables.51 The WikiLeaks 
model will almost certainly evolve and be replicated, posing the most 
significant challenge to date to the secrecy of government, corporate, 
and even personal information. 
 B. Step Two: Conversation & Debate 
 Access to information leads to conversation and debate, through 
which “political opinions are formed.”52 Shirky argues that “access to 
information is less important, politically, than access to conversation.”53 
Social media is a great facilitator of mass conversation. After all, conver-
sation is among its primary purposes.54 Social networks, and the Inter-
net as a whole, are of course awash with trivial exchanges. But there is 
also much meaningful debate. A novel aspect of conversation on social 
networks is that it is not limited merely to one-to-one conversation; the 
unique capabilities of social networks enable conversation from many-
to-many.55 
 Shirky’s point regarding the effectiveness of conversation via social 
media is borne out by the steps States take to block, limit, and monitor 
social networks. The United States recently underscored the political 
                                                                                                                      
50 WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.org/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
51 Scott Shane & Andrew Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 28, 2010, at A1. 
52 See Shirky, supra note 36, at 34. 
53 Id. at 35. 
54 See Zeynep Tufekci, Delusions Aside, the Net’s Potential Is Real, Atlantic ( Jan. 12, 2011), 
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GPS (Mar. 27, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/27/the-role-of-
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power of online conversation by concentrating its foreign policy efforts 
on promoting Internet freedom on social media rather than Web 1.0 
tools.56 
 Furthermore, under Ethan Zuckerman’s “cute cat” theory of digi-
tal activism, it is very difficult for States to shut down popular sites 
where the majority of people engage in trivial activities.57 That is, shut-
downs of popular social media sites will aggravate those who were pre-
viously apathetic, including supporters of the regime.58 Those who lose 
access to their “cute cats” may become politicized and interested in 
learning more about available “anonymous proxies,” which can be used 
to gain access to censored sites.59 In Zuckerman’s view, the dominance 
of trivia on social networking sites is in fact beneficial for the use of 
such sites by activists.60 A related danger for governments in shutting 
down certain sites is that they may focus greater attention on those sites 
than would have otherwise existed; the previously apathetic suddenly 
develop the curiosity to find out what all the fuss is about.61 Finally, 
shutting down social media can necessitate shutting down the Internet 
and mobile phone networks, which entails great economic costs.62 
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rain—a “small, crowded nation” —is owned by the royal family. One activist created and dis-
tributed PDF copies of the Google Maps image. In response, the Bahraini government 
blocked access to Google Maps, which only increased interest in the images. Zuckerman, 
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visited Jan. 6, 2012). The OECD estimated the economic cost to Egypt of shutting down the 
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ary 2011 to be US$90 million in “direct costs” and far more in “indirect costs.” See id. 
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IV. The Arab Spring and Social Media 
 So what role has social media played in the Arab Spring? Certainly, 
social media alone did not cause the revolutions and demonstrations. 
The underlying cause of all the uprisings has been mass dissatisfaction 
with incompetent, corrupt, and oppressive systems of government and 
growing gaps between rich and poor. Skyrocketing food costs, which 
ironically have been caused by global conditions rather than local eco-
nomic incompetence, have deepened dissatisfaction.63 
A. A Social Media Profile of the Region 
 Large percentages of Arab populations are under thirty years old 
and are far more educated than their parents. Many resent being un-
employed and are frustrated by an apparent lack of future opportuni-
ties. Many are also tech-savvy and use social media: people under thirty 
constitute 70% of Facebook users in the region. A study by the Dubai 
School of Government estimated that the number of Facebook users in 
the region almost doubled from 11.9 million in 2009 to 21.3 million in 
2010. The growth in Facebook users in the region in the first quarter of 
2011 was a further 30%. As of April 2011, Facebook penetration was 
1.37% in Yemen, 1.94% in Syria, 3.74% in Libya, 7.66% in Egypt, 13.1% 
in Palestine, 21.25% in Jordan, 22.49% in Tunisia, and 36.83% in Bah-
rain. Twitter is not nearly as popular as Facebook; its active user base 
constitutes less than 1% of the population in the Arab world, excluding 
the Gulf States and Lebanon.64 One reason for the small user base is 
that Twitter does not yet offer an Arabic interface, though one was 
scheduled to launch in 2011.65 
B. A Twitter Timeline of the Uprisings 
 Tunisia witnessed the first major demonstrations of the Arab upris-
ings and the first ousted dictator, President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. In 
2008, Zuckerman drew attention to sophisticated cyber activism in Tu-
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nisia, including “mashups” of iconic videos designed to mock Ben-Ali, 
and the use of data from a plane-spotting website to determine that 
Ben Ali’s personal jet travelled more often than he did, which lead to 
the exposure of his wife’s European shopping junkets.66 
 WikiLeaks stirred simmering Tunisian discontent when, in partner-
ship with The Guardian, it released leaked U.S. State Department cables 
detailing the United States’ opinion of and dealings with the decades-
old Ben Ali regime. The cables alleged gross corruption within Ben Ali’s 
family and systematic oppression by the regime.67 In fact, TuniLeaks—a 
site linked with Nawaat, a Tunisian dissident site—released the leaked 
cables a few days earlier than WikiLeaks.68 The existence of corruption 
was common knowledge within Tunisia, but publication of the cables 
brought the issue starkly into the open. This clear evidence of Western 
complicity in, or at least tolerance of, the egregious conduct of the Ben 
Ali regime sparked outrage and conversation in both real and virtual 
communities.69 
 On December 17, 2010, in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bou Zid, the 
police told a young street vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi that he 
could not continue his business unless he paid a bribe that he could not 
afford. After the governor declined to hear his grievance, Bouazizi set 
himself on fire in protest. News of his self-immolation spread through-
out the town, sparking protests and clashes with police.70 
 Videos of the Sidi Bou Zid protests were uploaded to Facebook, 
which, unlike other video sharing sites, was not blocked in Tunisia. In-
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deed, Ben Ali’s attempt to censor Facebook in 2008 simply encouraged 
more Tunisians to join via proxy sites, an episode that may be a real life 
manifestation of Zuckerman’s “cute cat” theory.71 Websites like Nawaat 
curated and captioned Sidi Bou Zid videos that Al Jazeera, the Qatar-
based cable network, in turn broadcast to the region. Though officially 
blocked in Tunisia, Al Jazeera was nevertheless able to broadcast citizen 
media from the ground into the country via satellite. Given that print 
and broadcast media was controlled within Tunisia, social media served 
a vital role in spreading word of the uprising.72 A Facebook group enti-
tled “Mr President, Tunisians are setting themselves on fire” was estab-
lished,73 while Tunisian Twitter users spread the hashtags #bouazizi, 
#tunisia, and #sidibouzid to show solidarity with the protesters and to 
organize and galvanize country-wide protests.74 The Dubai School study 
found that the number of Facebook users in Tunisia increased by 8% in 
the first two weeks of January 2011 alone.75 
 Regarding international reporting of events in Tunisia, social me-
dia was the “canary in the coal mine,” as it has been for all of the Arab 
revolts since. Global Voices—a website that monitors, collates, trans-
lates, and sources stories from social media in the developing world— 
began reporting early on the Tunisian demonstrations.76 By December 
30, 2010, Global Voices noted the seepage via social media of news of 
the unrest from within Tunisia, though mainstream media coverage 
other than Al Jazeera was still absent.77 Among the tweets highlighted 
in that story was the following from Egyptian activist Wael Nofal: 
“@stephenfry Are you following what’s going on in #SidiBouZid #Tuni-
sia? It’s odd why western media turned face away, unlike #Iran last 
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year.” Nofal’s interesting attempt to spread the message through British 
comedian and prolific tweeter Stephen Fry—who at the time had over 
one million followers on Twitter—demonstrates the diverse avenues 
social media offers for spreading a story effectively. Nevertheless, by 
January 12, only two days before Ben-Ali’s fall, Ethan Zuckerman post-
ed a blog on the lack of mainstream media coverage entitled “What if 
Tunisia Had a Revolution, But Nobody Watched?”78 
 Of course, once Ben Ali fled the country on January 14, the world 
started paying attention to Tunisia.79 Overwhelming support expressed 
via social media from its Arab neighbors, along with a feeling of “we 
can do it too,” became immediately apparent. A prescient tweet from Al 
Jazeera’s Dima Khatib a day later read: “No Arab leader is sleeping to-
night. #SidiBouzid has invaded their bedrooms.”80 This was likely true 
for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who soon encountered the 
#sidibouzid spirit himself. 
 Social media-driven protests existed in Egypt prior to the 2011 rev-
olutions. In 2007, a young activist named Ahmed Maher noticed that 
the Facebook page for the Egyptian football team had attracted 45,000 
“fans,” and wondered if a political movement could be formed on the 
network. In March 2008, Maher and colleague Israa Abdel-Fattah cre-
ated a Facebook page called “April 6 Youth,” which supported a 
planned industrial strike and promoted it through emails and viral 
“marketing.” The page attracted 70,000 members in three weeks, turn-
ing the strike into a major protest that embarrassed the Mubarak re-
gime. Group members subsequently used the page to share organiza-
tional tactics and other information in preparation for additional 
protests. Members also fostered online and face-to-face connections 
with Serbia’s Otpor movement, which had helped remove Slobodan 
Milosevic from power in 2000 through non-violent demonstrations. Al-
though the April 6 Youth group attempted to organize other major 
protests, such as a beach protest in Alexandria, police thwarted the at-
tempts after monitoring the group’s online activities. Interviewed after 
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the 2011 Egyptian revolution, Maher claimed that those failed protests 
in fact represented an important step in the group’s progress: 
Because of this day, we know we are an important group. They 
came for us right away. Why? Because we are a real problem 
for them. Thanks to that day, people all over Egypt and outside 
of Egypt—they know us. They know of this group that is against 
the government and that we are dangerous to the regime.81 
 After Tunisia, the April 6 Youth movement, along with important 
social media allies, saw an opportunity to turn their annual but “little-
noticed” protest on Egypt’s Police Day ( January 25) into a much larger 
demonstration.82 The hashtag #jan25 began trending,83 calling people 
to attend rallies and signaling to the media and the outside world to 
watch out for major protests in Egypt on January 25. Tens of thousands 
of people turned out, prompting the swift organization—again by so-
cial media—of another protest, a Day of Rage, on January 28.84 The 
momentum of protest snowballed into seventeen days of massive dem-
onstrations that ultimately forced the resignation of Mubarak on Feb-
ruary 11.85 
 Beginning on January 27, Egypt shut down its Internet for five 
days, disrupting social media communications. However, the Internet 
blackout probably backfired by provoking a surge in protest activity, 
because getting out in the streets was the only way “to find out what was 
happening.”86 According to the Dubai School survey, over half of the 
respondents in Egypt (56.35%) and Tunisia (59.05%) felt that blocking 
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the Internet mobilized people to “find creative ways to organize and 
communicate.”87 
 Main stream media coverage of the protests accompanied social 
media coverage. Coverage of the Arab protests since Tunisia’s have 
consisted of a mixture of social and traditional media. Given that the 
action is taking place in its backyard, it is not surprising that Al Jazeera 
has led the way. Al Jazeera pioneered the integration of traditional ser-
vices with social media, ensuring that its syndicated stories are prompt-
ed and informed by a multitude of citizen journalists on the ground.88 
This model was crucial in spreading the news of Bouazizi and Sidi Bou 
Zid, news that spread with devastating effect to Tunis, Cairo, Benghazi, 
and beyond. Unlike in Tunisia, in Egypt the coverage was live. In Cairo, 
Al Jazeera trained its cameras—which had not been allowed into pre-
revolution Tunisia—on Tahrir Square, the iconic site of the main pro-
tests, for the entire protest period. Egypt became the biggest story in 
the world as the protests rolled on to the increasingly inevitable climax 
of Mubarak’s downfall.89 
 Just as the iconic #jan14 and #sidibouzid hashtags for Tunisia led 
to #jan25 trending for Egypt, Twitter hashtags for planned “days of 
rage” in other States also began trending: #jan30 in Sudan, #feb3 in 
Yemen, #feb5 in Syria, #feb12 in Algeria, #feb14 in Bahrain, and #feb17 
in Libya. The Dubai School study reveals that calls to protest in the re-
gion, which first appeared on Facebook, resulted in actual street protest 
in all but one instance.90 This does not mean that the relevant Face-
book pages “were the defining or only factor in people organizing 
themselves on these dates, but as the initial platform for these calls, it 
cannot be denied that they were a factor in mobilizing movements.”91 
 In Sudan, the Al-Bashir government quickly stifled the planned 
protests. In Algeria, although protests were not as heated or as constant 
as in other parts of the Arab world, they resulted in some welcome re-
forms such as the lifting of a long-standing state of emergency. In Yem-
en, protests began on the scheduled day and continue to the time of 
writing; President Saleh is clinging to power and his days as leader ap-
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pear to be numbered. In Syria, protests were thwarted on the original 
planned date of February 5, but erupted belatedly in March, and have 
continued to the present, despite the government’s demonstrated will-
ingness to use deadly force against protestors. The violent response 
continues to isolate President Assad’s regime from the international 
community. In Bahrain, protests began as scheduled on February 14 
and an enormous percentage of the country’s population mobilized to 
call for reforms of the monarchist government. Nevertheless, the Bah-
raini government—with the aid of its Gulf allies in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
and the United Arab Emirates—seems to have successfully cracked 
down on the opposition.92 It has, for the time being, put the protest 
genie back in the bottle, though outrage continues to be voiced via so-
cial media, such as by @angryarabiya. 
 Finally, in Libya, protests began in Benghazi and quickly spread 
throughout the country. After a reportedly brutal response by Muam-
mar Gaddafi, the unarmed protests quickly morphed into an armed 
rebellion and civil war, and the rebels were supported by NATO air-
power authorized by the United Nations (U.N.). In August 2011, Gad-
dafi was forced to flee the capital Tripoli and a transitional government 
took power. On October 20, 2011, Gaddafi was killed after being cap-
tured by rebel forces.93 Given the very different trajectory of the Libyan 
uprising—namely, its rapid metamorphosis from unarmed protests to 
armed rebellion to international war—the importance of social media 
as a catalyzing force for revolution took a back seat. Twitter’s influence 
paled in comparison to NATO bombs. 
 While the “Twitter revolutions” outside Egypt and Tunisia have not 
been as successful, the contagion effect—including the enthusiasm 
whipped up by trending hashtags, dissident Facebook groups, and 
mainstream media—continues to threaten some of most oppressive re-
gimes in the world. At the very least, the Twitter revolutions reveal that 
the apparent stability of these regimes often is merely a facade. 
C. Leaderless Revolutions 
 In light of Gladwell’s assertion that successful social movements 
require organized hierarchies rather than loose networks, it is interest-
ing to note that the Arab protests lack a hierarchy. Traditional organized 
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anti-government bodies, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, or 
prominent opposition figures, such as Egypt’s Mohammed El-Baradei, 
came to the protests late and had little or no leadership role. The faces 
of the Arab revolutions have not been icons like Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Corazon Aquino, Alexander Dubcek, Vaclav Havel, 
or Lech Walesa, but rather unknown figures like Mohammed Bouazizi 
and Khaled Said, a young man beaten to death by Egyptian police in 
2010, whose deaths were associated with oppressive regimes and gener-
ated viral outrage online. 
 Among the organizers in Egypt were Ahmed Maher, founder of the  
April 6 Youth movement, and Wael Ghonim, a Google executive who set 
up the Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said” after Said’s murder. 
Ghonim helped the protests come about, but he was not a “leader” per 
se. Due to the fact that he disguised his identity as administrator of the 
“Khaled Said” page, few actually knew who he was until he disappeared 
at the hands of the police.94 His release twelve days later, by which time 
his identity was widely known, provided a boost to the protests at a time 
when they seemed to be waning.95 One organizer in Tunisia, a blogger 
named Slim Amamou, was arrested on January 6, only to be appointed 
the Minister for Sport and Youth in the post-Ben Ali government when 
he was released after Ben Ali’s flight.96 The loose networks at work in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and other Arab States have proven to be quite resilient, 
and perhaps harder to break than a smaller clique-ish hierarchy.97 In-
deed, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch Ken Roth pointed out 
a key advantage of leaderless revolutions: it is not as easy to decapitate 
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them as it was with some of the failed “color revolutions” in the former 
Soviet States.98 
 Gladwell’s suggestions regarding networks and hierarchies are 
probably more relevant in assessing the aftermath of the revolutions in 
Tunisia and Egypt. Regarding the latter, there is widespread concern 
that the revolution will be co-opted by more conservative but better or-
ganized groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, and taken out of the 
hands of the more liberal youth who brought about the revolution in 
the first place.99 A sophisticated level of organization is required to form 
political parties and run for office in the new “democratic” Egypt. While 
loose networks may play a key role in forcing dramatic and profound 
political change, more organized hierarchies are needed to anchor that 
change, otherwise counter-revolutionary hierarchies might take advan-
tage of the chaos to reverse or pervert the course of events.100 Neverthe-
less, the same Egyptian youth returned to Tahrir Square in huge num-
bers to press the army, which currently controls Egypt in the post-
Mubarak vacuum, to push forward with democratic reforms. 
D. Conclusion on the Role of Social Media in the Arab Spring 
 In September 2011, the University of Washington released a study 
based on an analysis of tweets during the revolutions in Tunisia and 
Egypt, and used that analysis as a proxy to conclude that social media 
played a central role in shaping political conversations inside and out-
side the Arab region in early 2011.101 Before and after the revolutions, 
social media was used to spread information about liberty, revolution, 
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and freedom. Spikes in “online revolutionary conversations often pre-
ceded major events on the ground.”102 Social media also helped spread 
the revolutionary contagion across the region; for example, advocates 
of democracy in Tunisia and Egypt picked up significant numbers of 
followers in countries that later had uprisings of their own. Interest-
ingly, the viral messages of the time increasingly emphasized messages 
about democracy, liberty, and freedom, as opposed to economic issues 
or Islam.103 While “[s]ocial media alone did not cause political up-
heaval in North Africa,” it “altered the capacity of citizens and civil soci-
ety actors to affect domestic politics.”104 
 The Dubai School survey, which was distributed to Tunisian and 
Egyptian Facebook users in March 2011, revealed the following infor-
mation about the primary uses of Facebook in early 2011: 
• Organizing actions and managing activists (Egypt 29.55%; Tunisia 
22.31%); 
• Spreading information to the world about the civil movement (Egypt 
24.05%, Tunisia 33.06%); 
• Raising awareness inside the country on the movement (Egypt 
30.93%, Tunisia 31.4%); and 
• Entertainment or other (Egypt 15.46%, Tunisia 13.22%).105 
Similarly, considering the popularity of the hashtags #egypt, #jan25, 
#libya, #bahrain, and #protest, along with surges on the dates of major 
protests, it appears that political issues dominated Twitter use in the 
region.106 These results indicate that social media fulfilled the functions 
in Shirky’s two steps by providing information and facilitating conversa-
tion about political matters. 
 In the Arab uprisings, the key steps of “galvanization” and “organi-
zation” followed Shirky’s two steps.107 Regarding the former, social me-
dia revealed the depth of feeling and commitment on an issue; it is eas-
ier to desire change and to be willing to act to effect it if one knows that 
others feel the same way. The same point is made in the University of 
Washington study: “[T]he public sense of shared grievances and poten-
tial for change can develop rapidly.”108 Regarding “organization,” social 
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media clearly synchronized the actions of the galvanized many, as ex-
emplified by the January 25 protests in Egypt. As Shirky argued in April 
2011, “these tools alter the dynamics of the public sphere” by allowing 
citizens to “coordinate more rapidly and on a larger scale than before 
these tools existed.”109 This organization function is particularly impor-
tant in the context of States that tightly control access to traditional 
sources of information and means of communication. Indeed, Glad-
well’s dismissal of social media can be criticized for ignoring the politi-
cal role of social media in developing states. 
 There is little doubt that the “weak activist” tool of social media has 
been used in the Arab world by a loose network of people to encourage 
or facilitate their taking of very great risks. They poured out onto the 
streets—a long way from clicking “like” —to demonstrate against and 
even overthrow some of the world’s longest lasting and most brutal dic-
tatorships. 
V. The Forces of Light and Darkness 
 The highly visible use of social media to foment Arab revolutions 
may change the way oppressive States confront the medium. When the 
alternative is revolution, the comparatively minor risk of a “cute cat” 
backlash may be worthwhile. A recent report from Freedom House in-
dicates that Internet freedom decreased overall in thirty-seven studied 
countries.110 Furthermore, some States, such as China, now possess the 
technology to selectively censor content, such that activist pages may be 
filtered out while the cute cats remain.111 That said, most authoritarian 
States do not yet have the resources to impose such technically sophis-
ticated censorship. 
 A major criticism of the role of social media in revolutions is that 
social media and the Internet can facilitate oppression as easily as they 
can facilitate pro-democracy activism. Cell phones and GPS systems 
make it much easier to track people. Iran and Belarus, for example, 
used the Internet to identify, locate, and target online dissidents. China 
recently conducted a major crackdown on bloggers and other activists 
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in the wake of post-Egyptian revolution call for a “jasmine revolution” 
in China. 
 Further, social media creates new risks of repressive surveillance. 
Data from relevant sites can provide information about a particular dis-
sident and that person’s connections; social media can therefore facili-
tate the uncovering of an entire dissident network rather than just one 
person. While seasoned dissidents may be cautious, they cannot control 
the activities of enthusiastic but inexperienced “fans” who might talk 
about their Facebook page. Another danger is that search engines can 
streamline surveillance; government secret services can data-mine par-
ticular keywords to spot likely subversive activity much more efficiently 
than by intercepting “snail mail.” New technologies—such as facial rec-
ognition software that can facilitate the identification and subsequent 
persecution of protesters who bravely or inadvertently ended up on 
YouTube—are similarly problematic.112 
 One response is to fight the dangers of new technology with newer 
technology. For example, Whisper Systems, a California company, do-
nated its encryption software to assist the Egyptian protesters in protect-
ing mobile phone messages from government surveillance.113 In early 
2011, Hillary Clinton announced that $20 million had been awarded 
from 2007 to 2010 “to support a burgeoning group of technologists and 
activists working at the cutting edge of the fight against Internet repres-
sion,” and that another $25 million would be awarded in 2011.114 In the 
battle of technologies, however, there is no guarantee that free enter-
prise favors freedom. The British firm Gamma International, for exam-
ple, offered spyware to the Egyptian government to facilitate surveillance 
of demonstrators.115 
 A problem with relying on technological experts to battle authori-
tarianism is that technological expertise does not necessarily include an 
understanding or appreciation of the possible social and political con-
sequences of new technologies. Internet companies, for example, are 
using new filtering techniques to tailor content to one’s perceived tastes, 
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including one’s political preferences.116 Google now personalizes search 
results, and Facebook personalizes users’ news feeds. Users may notice 
that the advertisements that pop up in Google searches and on Face-
book seem oddly relevant. This bespoke Internet experience is possible 
because Internet sites harvest information about people to draw conclu-
sions about what those people want to see in their searches and Face-
book feeds. It is designed to assist marketers and to enhance one’s In-
ternet experience. A frightening aspect of this development, however, is 
that such technology would be extremely useful to authoritarian re-
gimes seeking to identify political opponents, or even “cultural oppo-
nents” such as, in many States, gays and lesbians.117 It seems unlikely 
that technology companies have considered such inherent dangers in 
developing this new personalized version of the Internet. 
                                                                                                                     
 The fact is that revolution is always a dangerous business. As noted 
above, contrary to Gladwell’s assertions, social media can prompt high-
risk activities. It will be very difficult for a “Twitter Revolution” to suc-
ceed, however, if a regime responds with brutality and oppression, as 
Iran did against the Green movement in 2009 and as Bahrain did in ear-
ly 2011. Nevertheless, unfinished Twitter Revolutions, having exposed 
the underlying resentment against and vulnerability of an oppressive 
regime, plant seeds that may grow in the future. In this regard, I note 
that Syrians seem to have responded to the murderous suppression of 
protests by the Assad regime by mounting more and ever larger pro-
tests.118 Thus, at the time of writing, the success of Assad’s heinous and 
oppressive tactics is far from assured. 
A. The United States Leads the Way (Not) 
 In early 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in a 
speech on Internet Freedom that the U.S. State Department was “sup-
porting the development of new tools that enable citizens to exercise 
their rights of free expression by circumventing politically motivated 
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censorship.”119 She left no doubt that the United States would promote 
offshore cyber-activism and its interests: 
We want to put these tools in the hands of people who will use 
them to advance democracy and human rights . . . [W]e will 
work with partners in industry, academia, and nongovernmen-
tal organizations to establish a standing effort that will harness 
the power of connection technologies and apply them to our 
diplomatic goals.120 
 Despite the stated goal, there have been hiccups in the implemen-
tation of Clinton’s plan. For example, a major blunder occurred when 
the United States planned to facilitate the export of Haystack, technol-
ogy that was supposed to circumvent censorship and protect privacy. 
The technology, however, turned out not to be so secure; users that in-
stalled the technology in places like Iran would have been put in con-
siderable peril.121 
 Furthermore, other aspects of U.S. foreign policy undermine its 
stated goal of facilitating global Internet freedom. Its sanctions on Iran, 
for example, obstruct the ability of American companies to provide 
important information systems in that country. Ironically, the U.S. gov-
ernment’s call to Twitter to maintain its connections in Iran during the 
uprising of mid-2009 was probably a call to Twitter to continue break-
ing U.S. sanctions.122 Thus, U.S. policy in this area is not particularly 
coherent. 
 Shirky criticizes the Clinton plan, explaining that it “is difficult for 
outsiders to understand the local conditions of dissent.”123 Indeed, 
support from the United States risks “tainting even peaceful opponents 
as being directed by foreign elements,” particularly given widespread 
disdain for and suspicion of its agenda in the Arab world.124 The co-
founder of TuniLeaks and the Tunisian dissident site Nawaat, Sami ben 
Gharbia, scathingly characterized the Clinton policy as “hypocritical,” 
designed to use activist bloggers and their causes for the United States’ 
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own agenda “or simply for domestic consumption.”125 He does not see 
its Internet Freedom policy as “independent from the broader and 
decades old U.S. foreign policy, which has been based on practical ra-
ther than ethical or moral considerations such as the support of Hu-
man Rights.”126 After all, the United States clearly is not a consistent 
supporter of democracy in the Middle East, preferring in many cases 
the “stability” offered by allies such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and, pre-
viously, Mubarak in Egypt.127 Furthermore, the WikiLeaks cables re-
vealed blatant hypocrisy by the West regarding its tolerance of Ben-Ali 
and other oppressive and corrupt regimes: many cables exposed U.S. 
indifference to repression and corruption. In any case, it is not for the 
United States to guide democratic revolutions abroad. The interests of 
a remote and self-interested superpower will not often accord with the 
wishes and best interests of a State’s population. 
 Morozov believes that Clinton’s 2010 speech backfired. It alarmed 
rival regimes by suggesting that the Internet was not simply a forum for 
free speech but a foreign policy tool of the United States.128 These re-
gimes, such as Russia, reacted accordingly by clamping down harder on 
Internet freedoms.129 Iran recently announced its plan to launch its 
own “Halal Internet” in late 2012, which will be extensively censored in 
accordance with its government’s views of Islamic morality and its own 
“security” needs. Iran plans to offer this service to Islamic neighbors.130 
 In early 2011, Clinton updated her Internet Freedom speech and 
acknowledged an initiative “to connect NGOs and advocates with tech-
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nology and training that will magnify their impact.”131 In fact, at the 
time of the speech links already existed between Arab activist groups 
and government-funded groups in the United States. For example, State 
Department cables leaked by WikiLeaks confirmed that the April 6 
Youth Movement and the Bahrain Center for Human Rights received 
training from organizations including the pro-democracy NGO Free-
dom House, the International Republican Institute (affiliated with the 
Republican Party), and the National Democratic Institute (affiliated 
with the Democrats) on how to organize and build coalitions.132 Never-
theless, the resulting revolutions and protests in the Arab world were 
not driven by the agendas of these U.S.-based organizations. The United 
States was a reluctant or, at best, belated supporter of the protests. 
B. Propaganda, Sock Puppets, Good Speech, Bad Speech 
 Social media can be used to communicate misinformation as read-
ily as it can be used to convey reliable information. For example, “A 
Gay Girl in Damascus” (Amina Arrat) was one of the more popular Syr-
ian bloggers in the beginnings of the uprising, blogging about revolu-
tion, sexuality, and repression in Syria. The story fell apart, however, 
after “Amina” was revealed to be Tom McMaster, a masters student res-
ident in Scotland. The unmasking of “Amina” as a straight man from 
Scotland reminded us all how easy it can be to spread lies and use a 
false identity in cyberspace. It also no doubt undermined the real Syr-
ian activist blogosphere and its receptive audience.133 
 Similarly, while social media can be used to support pro-democracy 
forces, it can also be used to push pro-government propaganda.134 In 
March 2011, The Guardian reported that the U.S. military was “develop-
ing software that will let it secretly manipulate social media sites by us-
ing fake online personas to influence Internet conversations and 
spread pro-American propaganda.”135 While such tactics may be de-
signed to target extremist ideas that might foster terrorism, they could 
also thoroughly compromise the key “conversation” potential of social 
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media, especially if the same idea is adopted by other governments, 
companies, or NGOs. Propaganda is even being outsourced by some 
States, with U.S.-based public relations consultants providing “reputa-
tion management” services to governments such as those in Bahrain, 
Syria, and, previously, Tunisia.136 One can only hope that social media 
will prove resilient to such “sock puppets.” In reality, the tactic could 
seriously backfire, as the unmasking of a sock puppet thoroughly dis-
credits any ideas from that source.137 
 Social media can also spread bad ideas and content just as it can 
spread good ideas and content. As Morozov points out, it is wrong to 
assume that all bloggers in Russia, China, or Iran favor democratic re-
forms and pluralist tolerance. Many such bloggers are more hardline 
than their government; the blogosphere in authoritarian States harbors 
reactionaries just as it does in the West. Such reactionaries can even be 
cultivated to report on perceived subversive activity, as has occurred in 
Thailand, Saudi Arabia, and China, or to engage in cyber-attacks on 
dissident websites.138 
 Morozov quotes James Lewis, a senior fellow at the Center for Stra-
tegic and International Studies, for the proposition that “[c]yberspace 
is increasingly Hobbesian,” with a proliferation of egregiously hateful 
sites and pages.139 In April 2011, Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi of the Dubai 
School reported on the rise of “McCarthyist” trends in social media in 
the Gulf region, which is particularly vulnerable to an “us vs. them” 
mentality due to sectarian societal divides.140 In early October 2011, 
disturbing reports from Indonesia discussed thousands of tweets refer-
ring people to an Islamic extremist website in the aftermath of an Is-
lamist suicide bomb attack on a Christian church.141 
                                                                                                                      
136 Thor Halvorssen, PR Mercenaries, Their Dictator Masters, and the Human Rights Stain, 
Huffington Post (May 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thor-halvorssen/pr-
mercenaries-their-dict_b_863716.html. 
137 Jeff Jarvis, America’s Absurd Stab at Systematizing Sock Puppetry, Guardian (U.K.), Mar. 
17, 2011, at 15, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/ 
mar/17/us-internet-morals-clumsy-spammer. 
138 See Morozov, supra note 33, at 46–47, 103–04, 108–10. A website can be brought 
down by being overloaded with virtual visitors using viruses and malware. These are known 
as Distributed Denial of Service attacks. 
139 Id. at 219, 250; see Lloyd Grove, Facebook’s Holocaust Problem, Daily Beast (Aug. 18, 
2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/18/facebook-s-holocaust-denial-hate- 
speech-problem.html. 
140 Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi, Op-Ed., McCarthyism in Gulf Social Media, Gulf News, 
Apr. 24, 2011, available at http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/mccarthyism-in-gulf-
social-media-1.798619. 
141 Tom Allard, Indonesia Tweets Fuel Acts of Violence, Age, Oct. 3, 2011, at W8, available at 
http://www.theage.com.au/world/indonesia-tweets-fuel-acts-of-violence-20111002-1l3te.html. 
174 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:145 
 In the immediate aftermath of the British riots in August 2011, 
which resulted in widespread looting and property damage, British 
Prime Minister David Cameron partially blamed social media for the 
unrest, and raised the possibility of banning criminals from and other-
wise censoring social networks.142 The culpability of social media for 
the riots is disputed, and it seems likely that Blackberry’s encrypted 
messenger service, rather than the open social media platforms, played 
a bigger role in fuelling the unrest. A joint study by The Guardian and 
the London School of Economics indicates that Twitter, at least, was 
used more to respond to the riots than to start them, as well as to or-
ganize post-riot cleanups (using the hashtag #riotcleanup).143 Never-
theless, just as social media can coordinate legitimate and profound 
political mobilization, it can undoubtedly play a role in provoking may-
and pluralism. It de-
end
ons were being 
used by the Libyan government to crush the rebels.145 
hem. 
 Social media platforms are neutral tools that can be used to pro-
mote both good and bad causes. Of course, the traditional pro-speech 
argument suggests that in the free market of ideas, “bad” speech can be 
drowned out by “good” speech. Such a statement may seem trite and its 
premise cannot be proven, but the opposite cannot be proven, either. 
At the very least, social media increases participation; but greater par-
ticipation does not necessarily lead to democracy 
p s on “the values people bring to the table.”144 
 At least when it comes to verifiable facts, social media is capable of 
self-correction. A good example is Andy Carvin’s meticulous investiga-
tion and eventual debunking, via Twitter, of a rumor begun on Face-
book by a Libyan expat news service that Israeli weap
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C. Speech Ghettoes 
 A potential downside of social media is the so-called ghettoization 
of speech. Many people will follow, view, and become a fan of only 
those sites that accord with their preconceived world view. This phe-
nomenon may generate greater and more intransigent political divides, 
and, at worst, “enclave extremism.”146 Such a problem, however, already 
exists with regard to mainstream media, with, for example, conserva-
tives reading the Daily Mail or watching the Fox News Channel, and 
progressives reading The Guardian or watching MSNBC. Certainly, some 
social media ghettoes, like certain Facebook pages, may be heavily pro-
tected and effectively visible only to invitees, so they are less transparent 
than mainstream media ghettoes. Furthermore, the personalization of 
searches and Facebook feeds increases the ghettoization problem, be-
cause people are artificially shielded, often without their knowledge, 
from views that they are expected by an algorithm not to agree with.147 
The walls of some social media ghettoes, however, are more porous 
than those of established media ghettoes; for example, it is very easy for 
outsiders to penetrate Twitter ghettoes and spread stories that chal-
lenge their prevailing narratives. Finally, the existence of speech ghet-
toes is often a positive thing, as it is indicative of a lively, broad, and di-
verse political debate. 
D. The People’s Broadcasts 
 Morozov bemoans the greater ability of the powerful, such as state 
actors and multinational corporations, to dominate the “decentralized 
space” of the Internet.148 But social media, which is becoming increas-
ingly accessible to the poor across the world, can give a voice to the pre-
viously invisible in a way that other broadcast media, like television or 
radio, cannot. The nature of social media, which provides a global pub-
lic space that allows for an unprecedented level of citizen “broadcasting” 
and choice of sources, should help counter the phenomenon that the 
speech of the powerful generally overwhelms that of the powerless. 
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 While acknowledging the potential dark side of social media, Zey-
nep Tufekci postulates that the Internet, including social media, offers 
the opportunity for a people’s counterweight in the global political 
arena, which is otherwise dominated by remote entities such as super-
power States, multinational corporations, and international organiza-
tions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the 
U.N. In her words, “it has become very hard for citizens of any nation-
state to confront these powerful global institutions or to start to mean-
gf
re, as I write, the burgeoning 
#occupywallstreet movement, a loose alliance with general grievances 
against c ng trac-
tion in large part thanks 
revolution? What if they oppose a progressive, democratic 
vo
                                                                                                                     
in ully address the multiple global crises facing humanity,” such as 
climate change, ongoing unpopular wars against terror, and financial 
collapse. People are also weary of cynical realpolitik. 
 Truly global communities of citizens, which may be uniquely cre-
ated and facilitated by social media, offer at least some “hope of reclaim-
ing leverage on institutions of power.”149 In this respect, signs of Inter-
net-facilitated insurgency are evident in WikiLeaks and its present and 
future imitators, which pose significant challenges to government con-
trol over classified information. Indeed, outside the Arab world, an up-
surge in mass global dissent is evident. The protests in Spain are an in-
teresting example, where the crowd’s grievances were so multi-faceted 
that it was difficult to know exactly what their focus was. What they all 
had in common, though, was the shared sense that “politics as usual” 
was no longer acceptable.150 Furthermo
orporate power and greed in the United States, is gaini
to social media. 
VI. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube: Who Are These  
Companies Anyway? 
 Private companies run the key global social media platforms.151 
What social or human rights responsibilities do these entities have to 
their users? Is it appropriate to place any faith in them as facilitators and 
guardians of a 
re lution? After all, the status quo often suits big business. Perhaps the-
 
149 Tufecki, supra note 54. 
150 See Lisa Abend, Protests: Has the Revolution Come to Spain?, Time, (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2073524,00.html; Barbie Latza Nadeau 
& Mike Elkin, Spain Protests Claim ‘European Summer’ Follows Arab Spring, Daily Beast (May 
28, 2011, 2:41 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/05/28/spain-protests-
will-european-summerfollow-arab-spring/html. 
151 See Shirky, supra note 36, at 41. 
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se platforms are not as “neutral” as revolutionaries (or their adversaries) 
might expect. 
 Twitter executives are openly proud of the role their tool has 
played in the Arab Spring. Co-founder Biz Stone stated in an interview: 
“What I like to think of services like Twitter and other services is that it’s 
kind of a supporting role. We’re there to facilitate and to foster and to 
accelerate those folks’ missions.”152 As noted, the Mubarak regime shut 
down the Internet in the initial days of the Egyptian protests. Twitter 
responded by quickly setting up a “Speak2Tweet” service that allowed 
people in Egypt to leave messages at a local phone number that were 
then transcribed and tweeted to the world.153  Similarly, Google openly 
at sensitive times.157 U.S. legislators—notably, Illinois Senator Richard 
Durbin—lobbied Facebook to change its policy so as to protect pro-
 
expressed its pride in its executive Wael Ghonim’s role in the Egyptian 
uprising, though there has been no suggestion that the company helped 
him facilitate the protests.154 YouTube, which is owned by Google, cu-
rated videos from Egypt to make them more easily searchable.155 
 In contrast, Facebook has not publicly embraced the revolutions. It 
actually removed the “We are all Khaled Said” page in November 2010 
after discovering that its administrator, Ghonim, used a pseudonym. 
The site was restored only after U.S. resident Nadine Wahab agreed to 
take on the nominal role of administrator.156 Anonymity will be desir-
able, even essential, for many activists to avoid identification, subse-
quent harassment, or worse. Facebook’s strict policy against fake identi-
ties and pseudonyms led to the removal of activist webpages, sometimes 
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democracy activists, but Facebook refuses to do so.158 The company 
claims the policy is necessary to avoid fraud and to ensure user ac-
countability.159 Regardless, Facebook’s core concern is hardly the pro-
motion of revolutions: its “overriding objective is the much more typi-
cal one of expanding its market while avoiding bad PR and staying out 
of trouble with governme 160 
aws in order to conduct business in a particular State. 
e 
vism, 
hic
                                                                                                                     
nts that set the rules.”
A.Censorship Policies 
 A key concern regarding the value of social media sites to political 
change is the extent to which the relevant sites are censored. While the 
perception of social media is that it facilitates interaction between users 
sharing content, the fact is that the content is mediated through, and 
can be suppressed by, a private intermediary. There are two distinct is-
sues here. One issue concerns the extent to which a company assents to 
local censorship l
Th second issue concerns censorship of content imposed by compa-
nies themselves. 
 The first issue is particularly prominent with regard to Internet 
companies doing business in China. Internet companies that operate in 
China must comply with the country’s strict censorship rules, or be ban-
ished outside its firewall, which means that content is either inaccessible 
or slow to upload, and therefore less likely to be accessed.161 At the time 
of writing, Facebook is reportedly in negotiations to enter the Chinese 
market, and has clearly signaled its willingness to comply with China’s 
censorship demands.162 The benefits to Facebook of access to China 
means that it may itself work out how to separate the cute cats, which 
will presumably be allowed by China, from anti-government acti
w h will almost certainly not be. Of course, local censorship rules stifle 
the utility of a site as a catalyst for spreading or fomenting dissent. 
 
158 See Dick Durbin, Op-Ed., Tyrants Can Use Facebook, Too, Politico (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/50739.html. 
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the new social networking site Google+ has stepped back from using a similar “real name” 
policy due in part to backlash about danger to political dissidents). 
160 Weisberg, supra note 155. 
161 See Sarah Joseph, Blame It on the WTO: A Human Rights Critique 138 (2011). 
162 Tania Branigan, Facebook May ‘Block Content’ Claim as Speculation Grows over Entry into 
China, Guardian (U.K.), Apr. 20, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/ 
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 Although the issue of business acquiescence in State censorship 
receives more attention, company-imposed censorship is potentially 
more pernicious in undermining progressive social movements.163 A 
government’s censorship rules may be more transparent than those of a 
company. In States that respect the rule of law, one might be able to 
successfully challenge a State’s censorship of material in court. By con-
trast, there are few official remedies available if Facebook chooses to 
take one’s page down: it is, after all, Facebook’s platform. It is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct a site elsewhere on the Inter-
net, particularly if the site had tens of thousands of followers and sophis-
cat
d details.166 The 
                                                                                                                     
ti ed multimedia. In that light, I briefly examine the censorship poli-
cies of three key social media sites: Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. 
 Twitter claims that it avoids censorship as much as possible.164 For 
example, while “specific threats of violence against others” are re-
moved, Twitter’s policy appears to allow offensive language, abusive 
language, and even generalized threats or hate speech, except where 
illegal under local law.165 In late 2010, Twitter encountered controversy 
when it temporarily halted access to the account for “Anonymous” —a 
group of cyber-vigilantes who attack governments and companies— 
after the group apparently tweeted private credit car
removal of such private information seems reasonable. In any case, 
Anonymous has since resurrected its Twitter account. 
 Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities provides that 
its users cannot “post content that: is hateful, threatening, or porno-
graphic; incites violence; or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous vio-
lence,” or that is “unlawful, misleading, malicious, or discriminatory.” 
These rules sound reasonable, except that Facebook reserves the right 
to remove content if it “believes that it violates [the] Statement.”167 
There is no provision for appeal or even a hearing prior to the content 
removal. Facebook may not always exercise its discretion wisely. For ex-
 
163 See Rebecca MacKinnon, Address at TEDGlobal, Let’s Take Back the Internet! ( July 
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ample, on April 16, 2011, Facebook removed a photo of two fully 
clothed men kissing from a user’s profile for alleged breach of its Terms; 
it turned out that the photo was in fact a still image from the British 
soap opera Eastenders, which screens during family hours in the United 
ing
ary student fees. As with “We are all Khaled Said,” Face-
aceful protests in the Occupied 
err
tread a fine line between allowing its platform to be used for the or-
                                                                                                                     
K dom.168 It is difficult to discern exactly what part of the Terms the 
photo breached. 
 On April 29, 2011, Facebook was accused of “purging” activist ac-
counts in the United Kingdom when it suddenly removed dozens of 
pages that challenged a variety of government policies, such as the tri-
pling of terti
book claimed that the pages breached its Terms because they used fake 
profiles.169 
 Facebook also found itself mired in controversy over its initial re-
fusal, and then acquiescence to, a request by the Israeli government to 
remove a page promoting a Third Intifada in the Occupied Territories, 
on the grounds that the page promoted violence against Jews. From a 
human rights perspective, there is certainly nothing illegitimate about 
Facebook being used to promote pe
T itories, just as it has been used to promote protests in other parts of 
the Middle East and the world.170 
 Facebook also came under fire from the Syrian government for 
taking down pages associated with the Syrian army.171 Syrian protesters 
likely welcomed this instance of censorship, but it gave rise to concerns 
that Facebook was “taking sides,” and therefore manipulating the po-
litical or revolutionary messages broadcast on its powerful site. Given 
the importance of Facebook pages in promoting demonstrations 
against, and even the overthrow of, Arab governments, Facebook must 
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ganization of peaceful protests—which often contain comments that 
are not peaceful—and pages that promote violence and hate.172 One 
can only speculate how Facebook decides what content crosses the line 
from political speech into hateful speech, and what the credentials are 
of the people making these decisions. Furthermore, even violence is 
sometimes legitimate, as in the case of proportionate self-defense 
against a government crackdown, as may have occurred in Libya, 
Yemen, and Syria. In such situations, should Facebook remove pages 
at 
o-
lenc
YouTube is, at its core, a global forum 
for free expression.175 
                                                                                                                     
th advocate fighting back against a violent regime? 
 YouTube’s Community Guidelines specify that videos should not 
show “bad stuff” including “animal abuse, drug or substance abuse, or 
bomb making,” “pornography or sexually explicit content,” “graphic or 
gratuitous violence,” “gross-out videos,” and “hate speech.”173 Google, as 
the owner of YouTube, amended the policy on violence after it was criti-
cized in 2007 for removing videos showing police abuse in Egypt.174 In 
response to allegations that it was removing videos of post-election vi
e in Iran in 2009, YouTube addressed the controversy on its blog: 
We’ve noticed some claims going around that YouTube has 
been engaging in acts of censorship and removing some of 
these videos from the site. Unless a video clearly violates our 
Community Guidelines, we will not take it down. In general, 
we do not allow graphic or gratuitous violence on YouTube. 
However, we make exceptions for videos that have educa-
tional, documentary, or scientific value. The limitations being 
placed on mainstream media reporting from within Iran 
make it even more important that citizens in Iran be able to 
use YouTube to capture their experiences for the world to see. 
Given the critical role these videos are playing in reporting 
this story to the world, we are doing our best to leave as many 
of them up as we can. 
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 Nevertheless, YouTube is still criticized on occasion for censorship 
of content, and likewise for its failure to censor certain content, such as 
that which is allegedly hateful.176 As with Facebook, the process by 
which YouTube decides to remove content is opaque, the credentials of 
the decision-makers are unknown, and its censorship decisions are not 
reviewable by a third party. 
B. Privacy 
 Privacy is another important human rights concern that has been 
affected by the proliferation of social media. Internet companies and 
social networking sites harvest vast amounts of users’ personal informa-
tion, which enables the ongoing development of personalized Internet 
searches.177 Facebook is constantly criticized for changing its platform 
in ways that tend to undermine the privacy preferences of its users; its 
default settings generally favor openness at the expense of personal 
privacy. While a user can restore his or her privacy settings, he or she 
does not always know that the rules and privacy settings have changed, 
and therefore may inadvertently share personal information much 
more widely than he or she intends. Julian Assange, the founder of 
WikiLeaks, has bluntly described Facebook as “the most appalling spy 
machine that has ever been invented,” constituting a giant database of 
willingly volunteered information.178 
 In addition, the danger exists that a social media company could 
release a user’s private information to unfriendly governments. In early 
2011, the United States subpoenaed Twitter to hand over information 
on certain users associated with WikiLeaks. Twitter informed those us-
ers, who unsuccessfully challenged the subpoena in court.179 A key 
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point to note is that Twitter was not required to tell the users of the 
subpoena; it could have handed over the information without their 
knowledge. One wonders how many times such information might 
have been surrendered to governments without users’ knowledge in 
the past. In a famous instance in 2004, Yahoo turned over information 
that helped China identify a dissident blogger, Shi Tao, leading to his 
arrest and imprisonment.180 Furthermore, governments place signifi-
cant pressure on providers who fail to acquiesce in attempts to monitor 
data. Smartphone manufacturer RIM, maker of BlackBerry, has been 
involved in a dispute with a number of States, including the United Ar-
ab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Lebanon, and India, over the 
level of security it provides to users, because it hinders the ability of 
those States to monitor data.181 
 While these companies’ policies, particularly on censorship, may 
not be challengeable via official channels such as the courts or adminis-
trative agencies, the companies are susceptible to other pressure 
through criticism that harms their image and brand. For example, Fa-
cebook faced a revolt on its own pages in response to its decision to 
take down the Eastenders photo. Additionally, videos critical of YouTube 
are routinely loaded and shared on YouTube. While such protests may 
generate disdain for the company, the use of their own platforms is 
hardly a form of protest that hurts them. In this respect, it is worth re-
calling “Quit Facebook Day” on May 31, 2010, a protest against Face-
book’s continued tinkering with its privacy policies. The campaign was 
not particularly successful; only 32,000 people, or just 0.008% of all Fa-
cebook users, actually quit Facebook that day.182 Indeed, just as the 
“cute cats” theory might work to insulate social media sites from gov-
ernment restrictions, it might also work to insulate social media sites 
from the wrath of censored activists. That is, people who use these sites 
to share photos and videos of cute cats might not care if another per-
son’s protest page is removed. This enduring loyalty of the majority 
means that companies have a wider margin within which to upset the 
activist minority. 
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C. The Responsibility and Accountability of Social Media Corporations 
 Sparked in part by the Shi Tao incident, concern over the human 
rights responsibilities of Internet companies prompted the creation of 
a voluntary global initiative for such companies to pledge to protect 
online privacy and free expression. Launched in late 2008, the Global 
Network Initiative constitutes a “multi-stakeholder group of companies, 
civil society organizations, investors and academics.”183 The initial cor-
porate members were the then-Big Three of the Internet: Google, Ya-
hoo, and Microsoft. Nearly three years later, they remain the only three 
corporate members; neither Facebook nor Twitter, nor indeed any 
other corporation, has joined the Global Network Initiative.184 The Ini-
tiative faces great criticism; for instance, in the three years since its 
launch (which followed a two year gestation period), the Initiative has 
failed to generate any assessment of the participant companies’ com-
pliance with its principles.185 One of the world’s key human rights 
NGOs, Amnesty International, was involved in the initial discussions 
but refused to join the Global Network Initiative, citing its disappoint-
ment with the weakness of the final outcome.186 
 The major social media companies exercise a power over politics 
and potential social change that is not commensurate with their exper-
tise or responsibility. The problem of the lack of corporate accountabil-
ity—particularly on the part of major multinationals—under traditional 
human rights law is well known, and prompted the UN Human Rights 
Council to adopt the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights in July 2011.187 They are not binding, however, and much work 
must be done if the Principles are to be adopted into corporate prac-
tice. The same is also true of the Global Network Initiative. 
                                                                                                                      
183 Global Network Initiative, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/ (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2012). 
184 Kopytoff, supra note 174. 
185 Larry Downes, Why No One Will Join the Global Network Initiative, Forbes (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2011/03/30/why-no-one-will-join-the-global- net 
work-initiative/. On its website, the Global Network Initiative announced that the first 
assessments would be published in early 2012. GNI Announces Next Steps in its Assessment 
Process, Global Network Initiative ( June 17, 2011), http://www.globalnetworkinitiative. 
org/newsandevents/GNI_Announces_Next_Steps_on_its_Assessment_Process.php. 
186 Bobbie Johnson, Amnesty Criticizes Global Network Initiative for Online Freedom of Speech, 
Guardian (U.K.) (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/oct/30/ 
amnesty-global-network-initiative. 
187 See Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Council, 17th Sess., June 
16, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 ( July 6, 2011); Special Rep. of the Sec’y-Gen., Guid-
ing Principles on Business and Human rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
2012] Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights 185 
 To be fair, the major social media companies have largely been 
passive facilitators of revolution, not obstacles. Certainly, the iconic 
Western companies are safer intermediaries for users than smaller but 
still popular local companies, such as the Chinese or Russian versions 
of Facebook, which are more susceptible to government pressure.188 
 However, activists can perhaps only expect social media companies 
to “do the right thing” to the extent that such activism does not conflict 
with their commercial goals. The potential for such conflict may rise as 
relevant companies do more business with oppressive governments in 
lucrative markets like China. The potential for conflict could also rise if 
revolutions begin to challenge free market ideals, which suit the goals 
of Western social media companies as well as those who pay to use their 
advertising space. Indeed, the potential for conflict could rise as social 
media platforms continue to search for ways to improve profitability 
and raise revenue. Thus far, their extraordinary growth and social in-
fluence has not translated into major profits, though the companies 
themselves are valuable commodities. Facebook, despite being used by 
10% of the population of the planet, is projected to record a $1 billion 
profit in 2011—a relatively small figure in the world of multinational 
business.189 Likewise, Twitter’s wholehearted embrace of revolutionary 
speech might slacken once it starts to make money. After all, revolu-
tions necessarily lead to some instability that is not a favored market-
place condition for profitable business. 
Conclusion 
 Despite the apparent contributions of social media to the seismic 
events of the Arab Spring, Malcolm Gladwell remains an unrepentant 
skeptic. He has stated that twitter revolution enthusiasts like Shirky 
must show “that in the absence of social media, [the] uprisings would 
not have been possible.”190 Gladwell, however, asks for the impossible; 
after all, one cannot prove the counterfactual. 
 Perhaps Gladwell’s skepticism over the revolutionary potential of 
social media is correct with regard to the developed world. There, so-
cial media may be merely adding a cherry atop existing deep layers of 
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information and conversation, and in doing so it may dull rather than 
contribute to progressive social activism. On the other hand, the in-
crease of unfiltered connections between people of different cultural, 
political, and economic outlooks is likely to have some unprecedented 
and beneficial consequences for the development of local, national, 
regional, and global activism. 
 In any case, Gladwell too readily ignores the value of social media 
in States that efficiently suppress information and conversation, and in 
developing States, where long-voiceless people are suddenly connected 
to each other and to the outside world. It is in the developing world— 
Moldova, Iran, and now the Arab States—that it has had the most revo-
lutionary impact, though watchful eyes must be kept on Greece, Spain 
and the #occupy movement. Certainly, many of the Arab revolutionar-
ies themselves believe that social media played a significant role in the 
uprisings.191 Its importance for this young, tech savvy Arab generation 
reflects and perhaps surpasses the role of music in the counterculture 
protests of the 1960s. Both mediums played the role of providing in-
formation—albeit obliquely in the case of music—and facilitating con-
versation, galvanization, and organization. 
 Of course, it must be conceded that the revolutions are unfinished. 
At the time of writing, the revolutions had deposed autocratic leaders in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, but the governments that replaced them are 
yet to prove that they will adopt the liberal democratic values called for 
by the demonstrators. Moreover, the likelihood of civil war in Yemen 
and the continued deadly crackdowns in Syria cannot be ignored. In 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the political and social situation may deterio-
rate. Certainly, there is much fear among some Western commentators 
that Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, could 
ascend to power, perhaps signaling a step backwards for women’s rights 
and the rights of religious minorities, and encouraging the promulga-
tion of extremist ideologies.192 
 It is possible too that pro-democracy movements in the Arab world 
moved too quickly. The conversations arising from newly available in-
                                                                                                                      
191 See, e.g., Wael Ghonim, Address at TEDxCairo, Inside the Egyptian Revolution, (Mar. 
2011), available at http://www.ted.com/talks/wael_ghonim_inside_the_egyptian_revolution. 
html (discussing the important role of social media in the Egyptian revolution). 
192 See, e.g., Greg Sheridan, There’s a Scimitar Behind the Smile, Australian, Feb. 10, 2011, 
at F12, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/theres-a-scimitar-behind- 
the-smile/story-e6frg6zo-1226003211731; see also James Traub, Is There Light at the End of the 
Egyptian Tunnel?, Foreign Pol’y (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 
2011/09/23/the_storm_before_the_calm. 
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formation might not have been sufficiently mature or sophisticated to 
establish a properly functioning public sphere or civil society. Perhaps 
the resultant loose networks moved prematurely towards galvanization 
and organization. As Morozov put it, “[j]ust because you can mobilize a 
hundred million people on Twitter . . . does not mean that you should; 
it may only make it harder to accomplish more strategic objectives at 
some point in the future.”193 Perhaps there is a danger that the authori-
tarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt will be replaced by failed States. 
This may be even more likely in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. 
 It is patronizing to assume, however, that the Arab world is not 
ready for democracy, or that it is better for them to remain perpetually 
under the thumb of stagnant, autocratic, brutal, and corrupt regimes 
whose promises of reform are illusory. It is axiomatic that their desti-
nies should be determined by the citizens themselves—something that 
was impossible for Tunisians under Ben Ali, for Egyptians under Muba-
rak, and for Libyans under Gaddafi. Furthermore, the success of the 
revolutions should be judged by the conduct of the new governments 
that eventually emerge, not by their palatability to Western interests. 
Finally, there are some signs that the revolutions will lead to excellent 
human rights outcomes. For example, the interim Tunisian govern-
ment has ruled that political parties in its upcoming elections must pre-
sent equal numbers of male and female candidates.194 This develop-
ment is remarkably progressive, particularly by regional standards. 
 The need for caution in promoting social media as an instrument 
of progressive political change must be acknowledged. There is the po-
tential for governments to subvert the utility of social media through 
the extensive use of “sock puppets,” which would poison people’s trust 
in the platforms. There is no doubt that Internet-based technology can 
be used to track and profile dissidents, just as it can be used to promote 
the views of those dissidents. Good and bad ideas can be spread, and 
one cannot guarantee that the former will prevail. 
 The commercial, for-profit nature of the most popular social me-
dia platforms also poses a threat to their long-term utility as progressive 
political tools. The integration of the U.N.’s Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights and the Global Network Initiative into 
company policies must proceed apace to ensure, at the very least, that 
company personnel are aware of their very important influence on po-
                                                                                                                      
193 Morozov, supra note 33, at 196. 
194 David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisia Postpones Election, Possibly Aiding New Parties, N.Y. 
Times, June 8, 2011, at A10; Tunisia Gender-Parity Revolution Hailed, Al Jazeera (Apr. 21, 
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litical and social change and on human rights, and of the need to exer-
cise that power responsibly. A preferable long-term solution might be 
for key social media tools to be developed on a non-commercial basis in 
the public domain. Such tools already exist for blogs and collaborative 
projects—Wikipedia is a prime example. However, the development of 
a serious “public domain” rival to Facebook or Twitter that can capture 
enough users to make it influential, without utilizing expensive pro-
prietary technology, seems unlikely in the near term.195 For the time 
being, through no particular fault of those companies, they must wield 
political power that far outweighs their official responsibility and levels 
of accountability, and that is beyond their area of expertise. 
 Presently, social media in its various forms has created an un-
precedented global public space that vastly increases and amplifies the 
number of accessible voices and connections in all parts of the world. 
In the future, governments or other powerbrokers might seize control 
or compromise these platforms, and social media corporations might 
change their largely benign or even supportive attitude toward activism. 
For now, however, this digital communications Hydra provides a unique 
platform for millions of people to proclaim, in voices and actions heard 
around the world, that they are “as mad as hell and they aren’t going to 
take it anymore.”196 
 
195 There are “open source” social networks, such as Diaspora*. Diaspora, 
https://joindiaspora.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
196 These words are taken from Peter Finch’s immortal role in the 1976 film Network. 
Network (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976). 
